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The Definitive Guide to Tree Disputes in California 
 Ellis Raskin* 
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Every naturalist knows that trees are a critical part of the fabric of
many American urban and suburban ecosystems.  The American ethos has 
been shaped by a love for trees and forests and our forests have played an 
essential role in the growth and success of America.1
The true cost of tree disputes is best measured by the fact that at least 
four people have been killed over the last two years in tree-related property 
disputes.  In March 2012, a neighbor shot and killed Dennis E. Liller of 
  Given our communal 
affinity for trees, it is no surprise that property disputes involving trees are 
common.  All across this country, neighbors fight to let trees grow, to cut 
trees down, or simply to decide who owns the trees in the first place.  These 
disputes are messy, costly, annoying, and can even turn deadly. 
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2015; B.A.,
Occidental College, 2010.  I would like to thank Professor Nathan Scheg for his
invaluable guidance, the staff of West-Northwest for their hard work, and my friends
and family for their love and support.
1. ERIC RUTKOW, AMERICAN CANOPY: TREES, FORESTS, AND THE MAKING OF A NATION 5–
9 (2012). 
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Maryland in a dispute over who owned three trees.2  One year later, in March 
2013, Emmy Award-winning film director John Upton was shot during a 
dispute when his neighbor attempted to cut down trees that provided shade 
to Upton’s property.3  One month later, Gary Stocks and Daniel Kirchner of 
North Carolina were killed in an alleged tree dispute between neighbors.4
Even though most tree disputes do not end with bloodshed, tree 
battles can be extraordinarily costly.  DreamWorks co-founder David Geffen 
won a landmark $1.2 million Superior Court verdict in 1995 when a neighbor 
cut down eight pines and four eucalyptus trees that were on Geffen’s 
property.
  
5  In another extreme case, software magnate Larry Ellison offered 
$15 million to buy the property of his downhill neighbors so that he could 
cut down trees that blocked his views of the San Francisco Bay.6  Ellison and 
his neighbors ultimately signed an undisclosed settlement, and the downhill 
neighbors agreed to remove the trees.7
These stories are not unique—Californians have been fighting about 
trees since the dawn of statehood.
 
8
2. Peter Hermann, Neighbor Kills Neighbor in Dispute Over Trees, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 
Mar. 29, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-03-29/news/bal-neighbor-kills-
neighbor-in-dispute-over-trees-20120329_1_trees-dispute-neighbor. 
  However, tree law in California has 
3. Tony Perry, Director John Upton Killed by Neighbor During Dispute, Police Say, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/30/local/la-me-ln-director-
john-upton-shot-by-neighbor-during-dispute-police-say-20130330; see also Frank 
Elaridi  et al., Family, Friends Search for Answers in Neighborly Dispute that Ended in Death, 
ABC NEWS, Sept. 19, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/US/family-friends-search-answers-
neighborly-dispute-ended-death/story?id=20306848.  
4. Man Reportedly Kills Neighbors After Dispute Over Trees In Yard, CBS CHARLOTTE,
Apr. 2, 2013, http://charlotte.cbslocal.com/2013/04/02/man-reportedly-kills-eighbors- 
after-dispute-over-trees-in-yard/. 
5. Bob Pool, City Smart/How to Thrive in the Urban Environment of Southern California,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-11-24/local/me-
6652_1_tree-law.
6. Jim Carlton, Lots of Green Is at Stake in This San Francisco Spat: Oracle’s Larry
Ellison Views Less of the Bay, So He Hires a Tree Attorney, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303654804576343763766328484. 
7. Matt Hickman, Billionaire Magnate Larry Ellison Settles With Neighbors in Bizarre
Tree Lawsuit, FORBES, June 2, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
economics/ 2011/06/02/billionaire-magnate-larry-ellison-settles-with-neighbors-in-
bizarre-tree-lawsuit/.
8. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Estell, 5 Cal. 108, 108 (1855) (upholding an injunction
to stop a neighbor from cutting down trees involved in a boundary dispute); see also 
Chipman v. Emeric, 3 Cal. 273, 275 (1853) (involving a claim that the defendant cut 
down five hundred oak trees that belonged to the plaintiff). 
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undergone a radical transformation in the last decade.9  Property owners 
used to have broad ranging rights to remove encroaching trees or trees that 
obstructed views, but California law now requires property owners to take 
extreme precautions before relying on self-help to resolve tree disputes.10 
Additionally, municipalities now have broad ranging power to dictate how 
property owners should care for and maintain trees located on private 
property.11
The primary goals of this note are to provide a summary of current 
trends in tree law in California and serve as a resource for practitioners who 
are currently engaged in tree disputes.  This note will provide a summary of 
California laws on tree encroachments, obstructions, and municipal 
ordinances that regulate tree growth.  Although every tree dispute is unique, 
this note will provide general guidelines for how tree disputes can be 
resolved successfully in California.  
 
Another goal of this note is to provide policy recommendations for the 
future development of tree law in California.  Ninety-five percent of 
Californians live in urban areas12 and municipalities are committed to 
developing vibrant urban forests.13
9. Compare Bonde v. Bishop, 245 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952), with Booska
v. Patel, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241, 244–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  See also Rony v. Costa, 148
Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 647–48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
  Consequently, courts and lawmakers 
should encourage property owners to be responsible stewards of trees they 
care for to prevent potential injuries to neighbors and to their communities. 
Additionally, courts and lawmakers should encourage municipalities to take 
a proactive role in regulating the growth and development of privately 
owned trees in urban environments.  The best way to achieve these goals is 
for local communities and municipalities to utilize adaptive co-management 
strategies when balancing public and private interests to ensure sustainable 
growth for urban forests.  Our laws should encourage respect for trees and 
10. Booska, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244–45 (internal citations omitted); see also
Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1128 (Cal. 1981) (holding individuals have 
a duty to act reasonably when managing property if injury to others is foreseeable). 
11. See, e.g., Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165,
174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming a “view protection ordinance” that forced property 
owners to cut back the height of trees located on private property). 
12. Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html (“Of the 50 states, California [is] the
most urban, with nearly 95 percent of its population residing within urban areas.”).
13. See, e.g., San Francisco Urban Forest Plan: Phase One, Street Trees (Jan. 2014), SAN 
FRANCISCO PLANNING DEP’T, http://www.sf-planning.org/ftp/files/plans-and-programs/ 
planning-for-the-city/urban-forest-plan/Urban_Forest_Plan_Draft-01-15-14.pdf. 
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should provide incentives for private citizens to support the health of urban 
forests. 
II. Boundary Disputes and Encroachments
The stereotypical tree dispute is a case of nuisance, where branches or
roots from one neighbor’s tree extend into another neighbor’s property. 
While researching this note, dozens of friends and colleagues shared stories 
of problems they have had with neighbors and how they wished they could 
cut off offending branches.  They all asked the same question: could they cut 
off the branches without incurring liability?  The short answer is no. 
Although California courts once recognized an absolute right to cut off 
encroaching branches, property owners can now be held liable for harming 
their neighbor’s tree, even if they only cut the part of the tree that extends 
onto their own property.14
A. Determining Tree Ownership
  But before property owners can take action to 
resolve disputes, they must first determine who actually owns the offending 
tree.  
In California, trees belong exclusively to the owner of land where the 
trunk of the tree is located, even if the tree’s roots or branches extend into 
another person’s property.15  However, to the extent that they grow into or 
above a neighbor’s property, encroaching branches and roots belong to the 
individual upon whose land they encroach.16  If a tree’s trunk is located on a 
boundary line, where the trunk is located partly on the land of two or more 
coterminous owners, the tree belongs to all of them in common.17  If a tree 
splits into two trunks, with one trunk growing on one side of the property 
line and another trunk growing on the other side of the property line, the 
entire tree belongs to both neighbors in common as long as the point at 
which the tree grows out of the ground lies on both sides of a property line.18 
Even if the neighbors construct a fence or boundary over the middle of the 
tree, the entire tree still belongs to both neighbors in common.19
When awarding damages for harm to trees that are co-owned by 
neighbors, courts may prorate damages according to a co-owner’s 
  
14. Booska, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244–45.
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 833 (2013).
16. See infra Part II.B (discussing overhanging branches).
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 834 (2013); see also Scarborough v. Woodill, 93 P. 383, 384
(Cal. Ct. App. 1907) (referring to such trees as “line trees”). 
18. Kallis v. Sones, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 420–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
19. Id. at 420–22.
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proportional interest in a tree.20  Additionally, co-owners of trees that grow 
on boundary lines can obtain injunctive relief to prevent other co-owners 
from harming the tree.21  In fact, courts have granted injunctions to protect 
trees growing on boundary lines when the trees serve as a shelter or 
windbreak for one owner, even though the presence of the trees damages 
the land of other co-owners.22
In addition to trees that are physically located within the boundaries of 
the land they own, property owners maintain a “qualified” or “limited” 
interest in trees that grow in a public right of way in front of privately owned 
land.
  Generally, if there is any dispute over the 
ownership of a tree, property owners should contact a surveyor to determine 
where the tree is located in relation to property boundaries. 
23  However, this interest is subordinate to the rights of municipalities 
to “trim or remove them whenever the public interests require such action.”24 
These rights are also subordinate to other private easements in or along the 
public right of way, such as sidewalks and driveways.25  Nevertheless, 
property owners do have the right to sue for harm caused to trees situated in 
front of their property.26
B. Overhanging Branches
  
When the trunk of a tree grows entirely on one side of a property line, 
but the branches cross over the boundary line and into the property of 
another, the portion of the branches that cross over the boundary line 
belong to the individual who owns the property upon which the branches 
encroach.27
20. See infra Section IV.
  In the past, property owners had an “absolute right” to utilize 
21. Anderson v. Weiland, 55 P.2d 1242, 1242–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936).
22. Scarborough, 93 P. at 383–84.
23. Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 164 P. 35, 36–37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1917); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 831 (2013) (“An owner of land bounded by a road or street 
is presumed to own to the center of the way, but the contrary may be shown.”); see 
also infra Section V.B (regarding care for publically owned trees). 
24. Altpeter, 164 P. at 36–37.
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id. (“[I]f a person injures such trees without lawful right or authority, such
owner may maintain an action for damages for the injury so inflicted and recover 
such damages as he may be able to show that he has suffered by reason of any 
depreciation in the value of his property which has been occasioned by such  
injury . . . .”). 
27. Grandona v. Lovdal, 21 P. 366, 368–69 (Cal. 1889); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 829 (2013) (“The owner of land in fee has the right to the surface and to everything
permanently situated beneath or above it.”).
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self-help to cut off encroaching branches.28  A property owner could “take the 
law into [their] own hands” and cut off encroaching branches on their own, 
as long as they did not trespass across their neighbor’s boundary line or cut 
off any part of the tree that was located on their neighbor’s property.29  The 
antecedents of these rules are derived from English Common Law30 and “as 
a matter of historic tradition, courts have simply treated trees growing on or 
near borders as unique conditions and provided adjoining landowners with 
absolute protection from damage that arises from their natural 
encroachment.”31
However, this “absolute right” is no longer recognized in California.
 
32 
Instead, the right to cut encroaching branches is constrained by a duty to act 
reasonably.33  Individuals who cut encroaching branches may now be liable 
for causing foreseeable injuries to the health, aesthetics, or functionality of 
the tree they cut.34  If the branches are a nuisance, then property owners can 
go to court to ask for an injunction,35
28. Bonde, 245 P.2d at 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); see also Grandona, 21 P. at 368–69
(holding that a property owner may cut off encroaching branches “at his pleasure”). 
 but property owners cannot 
unilaterally cut off encroaching branches without assessing whether the 
29. Bonde, 245 P.2d at 620; Grandona, 11 P. at 624 (“[H]e may not cut down the
tree, neither can he cut the branches thereof beyond the extent to which they 
overhang his soil.”  (citations omitted)).  
30. Glenn A. McLeary, The Possessor’s Responsibilities as to Trees, 29 MO. L. REV. 159,
162–66 (1964). 
31. Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474 n.5 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988). 
32. Booska v. Patel, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241, 244–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
33. Id. at 245 (citing Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1128 (Cal.
1981)); see also WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, TORTS § 57 (5th ed. 1984) 
(explaining that property owners must not cause “unreasonable risks of harm to 
others in the vicinity”); see also 2 C.J.S. ADJOINING LANDOWNERS § 23 (2013) (“Each owner 
of adjoining land may trim on his or her own side trees and plants standing on the 
boundary line provided he or she does so without unreasonable injury to the interest 
of his or her neighbor . . . .  However, the rule is qualified by the right of an abutting 
owner to use its realty in a reasonable way.”). 
34. Booska, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244–45 (citing Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters,
Inc., 257 P.2d 653, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953)); Rony v. Costa, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 
647–48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108–09 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1980)); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3502 (2013) (“A person injured by a private 
nuisance may abate it by removing, or, if necessary, destroying the thing which 
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary 
injury.” (emphasis added)). 
35. See Bonde, 245 P.2d at 621.
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cutting will harm the rest of the tree on the other side of the fence. 
Consequently, property owners should exercise extreme caution before 
cutting off any encroaching branches to make sure they are not liable for any 
harm to their neighbors’ trees.  
In some circumstances, property owners may be able to also pursue 
civil action to force neighbors to cut off encroaching branches.36  If 
encroaching branches constitute a nuisance, injunctive relief may be 
available to abate the nuisance.37  In fact, in cases where encroaching 
branches do constitute a nuisance, courts recommend that injunctive relief is 
a preferable and “more orderly” remedy than self-help.38  However, in 
situations where encroaching branches do not constitute a nuisance, 
injunctive relief is not available to abate the encroachment.39
In general, anything that “interfere[s] with the comfortable enjoyment 
of life or property” is a nuisance.
 
40  California courts have interpreted this 
provision narrowly when examining whether tree branches constitute a 
nuisance.  Consequently, encroaching branches only constitute a nuisance 
when they injuriously affect the health, safety, or property of another—the 
mere encroachment of branches into a neighbor’s airspace is not, ipso facto, a 
nuisance.41  Furthermore, the branches will only constitute a nuisance if the 
encroachment interferes with economic interests that exist at the time of the 
encroachment.42
In most circumstances, falling leaves and branches will constitute a 
nuisance.
  Encroaching branches that interfere with future or 
prospective interests are not likely to constitute a nuisance.  
43 Courts have found that leaves and branches that fall off 
encroaching trees can constitute a nuisance when this debris clogs storm 
drains and litters a neighbor’s property.44
36. Booska, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244–45 (internal citations omitted); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3501 (2013). 
  For example, in Bonde v. Bishop, the 
California Court of Appeal held that a “continual dropping of branches” 
37. Grandona, 21 P. at 368; accord Bonde, 245 P.2d at 621 (holding that an
individual can obtain an injunction after proving a nuisance). 
38. Bonde, 245 P.2d at 621.
39. Grandona, 21 P. at 368–69.
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (2013).
41. Grandona, 21 P. at 368–69.
42. Id.
43. Parsons v. Luhr, 270 P. 443, 444 (Cal. 1928) (holding that falling branches
and leaves constituted a nuisance because they littered gutters and caused the 
aggrieved party to fear for their safety and granting an injunction to abate such 
nuisance); accord Bonde, 245 P.2d at 618–19, 621. 
44. Parsons, 270 P. at 444; accord Bonde, 245 P.2d at 618–19, 621.
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constituted a nuisance.45  It is not clear if fear or apprehension of falling 
branches alone can constitute a nuisance, but the facts of Bonde suggest that 
well-founded fear of harm can constitute a nuisance.46  The court in Bonde 
noted that the plaintiffs were “afraid of the overhanging limbs and because 
of them [were] afraid to leave their baby out in the patio.”47  There, the 
plaintiffs’ fear of falling branches interfered with their free use and 
enjoyment of their property, and this was one contributing factor for why the 
overhanging branches constituted a nuisance.48
Nuisances may also exist when trees interfere with utility easements. 
California courts recognize the right of utility companies to cut off branches 
of privately owned trees that interfere with electrical wires owned by the 
utility companies.
  
49  However, utility companies cannot cut more than is 
necessary—utility companies can only cut branches that interfere with the 
“proper and efficient use” of the wires.50  If a utility company does cut more 
than is necessary, or “wantonly and unnecessarily cuts or mutilates the 
trees,” the utility company will be liable for damages caused to the owner of 
the property in front of which the trees are located.51  As long as the cutting 
is necessary, property owners cannot bring a cause of action, even if the 
cutting of the trees depreciates the value of the property in front of which 
the trees are located.52
Property owners who control encroaching trees need not be the actual 
or proximate cause of the nuisance to be held liable.
 
53  For example, in 
Mattos v. Mattos, the California Court of Appeal held that a property owner 
was liable for abating a nuisance even though the nuisance was not caused 
by any intentional or negligent act or omission on the part of the property 
owner.54
45. Bonde, 245 P.2d at 618 (“It is almost a daily chore to clean the debris from
the tree.”). 




49. Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 164 P. 35, 36–37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1917); see also S. Bell Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Constantine, 61 F. 61 (5th Cir. 1894) (holding 
that a telegraph company was not liable for trespass when it cut trees that interfered 
with the company’s poles and wires). 
50. Altpeter, 164 P. at 37–38 (noting that utility companies owe a duty of
“efficient performance” to the public). 
51. Id.
52. Id. at 38.
53. Mattos v. Mattos, 328 P.2d 269, 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
54. Id. at 269–70.
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defendant’s property.55  The trees covered a substantial area of the plaintiff’s 
land and restricted the plaintiff’s ability to use the land for grazing purposes, 
“to which [the land was] normally devoted.”56  Even though the defendant 
did not cause the nuisance through any affirmative act or omission, the 
defendant was still liable for the nuisance.57
Although some jurisdictions recognize an “act of God” defense when 
unusually strong weather or unanticipated events cause trees to fall,
 
58 
California courts have been hesitant to endorse this defense.59  Rather, 
California courts have held that unusually strong storms do not constitute 
acts of God60 and property owners have an affirmative duty to guard against 
potential damage that could be caused by falling trees.61  Property owners 
should be aware that they might be liable for damage caused by falling trees 
in extreme weather events and tree owners should consult arborists to 
minimize potential liability.  
55. Mattos, 328 P.2d at 270.
56. Id. at 269–70.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Brown v. Sandals Resorts Int’l, 284 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2002)
(upholding an act of God defense when a palm tree fell on a hotel guest on an 
“extremely windy” night); Rector v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 120 So.2d 511, 
512, 522 (La. 1960) (holding that a strong windstorm that blew down a decayed tree 
was an act of God). 
59. Mattos, 328 P.2d at 270 (“[A]t most this storm was of somewhat more than
average intensity, warrants the implied finding that the falling of the trees was not 
within the category of an act of God.”); Mitchell v. City of Santa Barbara, 120 P.2d 
131, 133–34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 55 P.2d 847, 
849 (Cal. 1936)) (“[A] rainstorm which is merely of unusual intensity is not . . . [an] 
act of God.”); Smith v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 211 P. 843, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1922) (stating that a wind that blew down a tree onto a power line was not an act of 
God). 
60. Mitchell, 120 P.2d at 133–34.
61. Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Mining Co. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 116 P.2d 611,
615 (Cal. 1941) (“If a tree is in such close proximity to a pole line that wind may cause 
it to fall across the wires, the failure to provide against such eventuality is negligence 
. . . .”); Smith, 211 P. at 844 (“[I]f the palm tree stood in such a position as to endanger 
the defendant’s wire, the defendant should have properly protected its wire 
therefrom, and in failing to do so the omission was an act of neglect on the part of 
the defendant . . . .”). 
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C. Encroaching Roots
If the trunk of a tree is situated on one side of a property line, but roots 
encroach across the boundary, property owners can seek injunctive relief to 
abate encroaching roots when the roots constitute a nuisance.62  However, 
property owners may not enter their neighbor’s property to cut down trees 
that are the source of encroaching roots.63  Just like encroaching branches, 
encroaching roots only constitute a nuisance when they injuriously affect 
the property of another.64  Compensatory damages may also be available if 
the encroachment damages the plaintiff’s property.65
California courts used to allow property owners to utilize self-help to 
abate encroaching roots.
  
66  In Stevens v. Moon, the California Court of Appeal 
wrote that when encroaching roots constitute a nuisance, property owners 
may “[dig] into the ground, intercept and destroy the roots.”67  However, 
property owners are no longer permitted to utilize self-help to cut off 
encroaching roots when harm to the tree is a foreseeable result of the 
cutting.68  In the landmark tree law case Booska v. Patel, the California Court of 
Appeal rejected the notion that property owners have an absolute right to 
cut encroaching roots when damage to the tree is a foreseeable result.69  In 
Booska, the defendant hired a contractor to excavate and sever encroaching 
roots at a depth of three feet.70
62. Stevens v. Moon, 202 P. 961, 963–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921).
  This caused the tree to become unsafe, 
“unable to support life,” and had to be removed at the expense of the tree’s 
63. Fick v. Nilson, 220 P.2d 752, 753–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
64. Crance v. Hems, 62 P.2d 395, 367–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (holding that
encroaching roots from athel trees “killed, strangled, and completely destroyed” 
pecan trees on the property onto which the roots encroached); see also Grandona v. 
Lovdal, 21 P. 366, 368–69 (Cal. 1889) (holding that encroaching roots did not 
constitute a nuisance because they did not prevent the plaintiff from cultivating his 
land). 
65. Stevens, 202 P. at 963–64.
66. Id. at 962–63; see also Grandona, 21 P. at 369 (holding that encroaching trees
“in so far as they were on or over [the plaintiff’s] land, belonged to the plaintiff, and 
he could have cut them off, or trimmed them, at his pleasure”). 
67. Stevens, 202 P. at 962–63.
68. Booska v. Patel, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“[The
plaintiff] constructs an absolute right to do whatever he likes on his property, without 
regard to its impact on his neighbors.  This is not the law.”); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3514 (2013) (“[A property owner] must so use his own rights as not to infringe upon 
the rights of another.”).  
69. Booska, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 243.
70. Id. at 242–43.
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owner.71  The court held the defendant was liable for damaging the tree and 
that property owners have a duty to act reasonably to avoid foreseeable 
harm to their neighbors’ property.72
Tree roots that encroach underneath sidewalks and other publicly 
accessible walkways are a common source of liability.  If property owners 
maintain control or care over a tree, then they may be liable for injuries 
proximately caused by the negligent care of that tree,
  Since healthy roots are essential to the 
continued strength and vitality of trees, property owners should consult 
professional arborists before touching encroaching roots. 
73 including slip-and-
fall accidents caused by encroaching roots.74  Absent a local ordinance to 
the contrary,75 a municipality assumes liability for damages caused by trees 
which it maintains on publically controlled land.76 
71. Booska, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 242–43.
72. Id. at 244–45.
73. Moeller v. Fleming, 186 Cal. Rptr. 24, 25–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Alpert v. Villa Romano Homeowners Assn., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 375–76 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000). 
74. Alpert, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773–74 (internal citations omitted); see also CAL. 
STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5610 (2013). 
75. See e.g., S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE art. 16 § 805 (2010) (creating a cause of
action for injuries caused by improper maintenance of trees and establishing the 
process by which the city may relinquish maintenance responsibilities to private 
property owners);  Tree Maintenance Transfer Plan, SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC WORKS (2014), 
http://sfdpw.org/index.aspx?page=1478 (last visited Oct. 30, 2014) (outlining the 
city’s current plan to transfer responsibility and liability for maintenance to private 
property owners); see also infra Part V (discussing municipal ordinances regulating tree 
growth). 
76. Alpert, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 374–75 (citing Williams v. Foster, 265 Cal. Rptr.
15, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)) (“Where a particular abutter does not possess or own the 
street easement, and does not undertake maintenance of it, we see no legal basis for 
imposing liability for failure to properly maintain the sidewalk or planting strip in the 
absence of statute or ordinance.”); Jones v. Deeter, 199 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1984) (“[I]n localities where the city has habitually maintained the surface of the 
parkway, it is solely the city’s duty to keep this surface area safe for pedestrians; 
hazards on such areas are not attributable to abutting owners.”). 
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III. Obstructions of Light and Air
Unlike falling debris, the obstruction of light shining into a neighbor’s
property is not an actionable nuisance and injunctive relief is not available 
when trees obstruct light and air.77  Absent any municipal ordinances that 
guarantee otherwise, property owners do not have the right to light and air 
unobstructed by trees.78  The only exceptions are when the blockage of 
sunlight is malicious79 or if the trees obstruct a solar easement granted 
under the Solar Shade Control Act.80
In the landmark case Sher v. Leiderman, the California Court of Appeal 
reaffirmed that the obstruction of sunlight is not an actionable nuisance.
  
81 
There, the plaintiff sued when trees located on the defendant’s property 
grew over a period of ten years and ultimately obstructed sunlight to the 
plaintiff’s house.82  Shadows cast by these trees made the plaintiff’s home 
“dark and dismal” and adversely affected the home’s thermal performance.83 
Following the precedent established in Haehlen v. Wilson,84 the court held that 
this obstruction was not an actionable nuisance.85  Furthermore, the court 
noted that the defendant did not act maliciously because the defendant did 
not intend to deprive the plaintiff of sunlight at the time at which the trees 
were originally planted.86  Consequently, the court declined to grant a 
private nuisance for the obstruction of the sunlight.87
The court in Sher also limited the scope of the Solar Shade Control Act 
to “active solar collectors” designed for the purposes of “(1) water heating, 
(2) space heating or cooling, and (3) power generation.”
 
88
77. Haehlen v. Wilson, 54 P.2d 62, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936); accord Taliaferro v.
Salyer, 328 P.2d 799, 802–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that a neighbor’s 
obstruction of light and air is not an actionable nuisance). 
  The court 
specifically rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the Act provided a solar 
78. See Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357–58
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that obstructions of light and air are not, per se, a 
nuisance); Haehlen, 54 P.2d at 64 (holding that the doctrine of “ancient lights” does 
not apply in California). 
79. Haehlen, 54 P.2d at 64.
80. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25980, 25981 (2013).
81. Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 704–05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Id. at 700–01.
83. Id.
84. Haehlen, 54 P.2d at 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936).
85. Sher, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 703, 704–05.
86. Id. at 700–01, 704–05.
87. Id. at 703–04.
88. Id. at 705, 706–07 (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25981).
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easement for “passive solar collectors” like south-facing windows that warm 
buildings by letting in more sunlight.89
When a group of trees is planted in a row and the row of trees 
obstructs the view of a neighbor, the individual whose view is obstructed 
may be able to obtain injunctive relief to remove the obstruction under 
California’s “spite fence” statute.
  The mere fact that windows and 
skylights “take in” light does make these windows “active solar collectors” 
under the terms of the act.  Therefore, property owners cannot rely on the 
Solar Shade Control Act to remove trees that obstruct sunlight to windows 
and skylights.  
90 The “spite fence” statute protects 
adjoining landowners from fences and other structures “unnecessarily 
exceeding 10 feet in height maliciously erected or maintained for the 
purpose of annoying the owner or occupant of adjoining property.”91  These 
spite fences constitute a private nuisance.92  In Wilson v. Handley, the 
California Court of Appeal held that a row of trees planted to “annoy” a 
neighboring landowner could in fact constitute a “spite fence.”93  The court 
noted that a row of trees could violate the spite fence statute if they only 
block light and air, as long as the obstruction satisfies all other statutory 
requirements.94  However, if the trees had been planted to maintain 
aesthetic qualities or to protect the defendants’ privacy, the row of trees 
would not fit the definition of “spite fence” under the statute.95  In Vanderpol v. 
Starr, the court affirmed that a row of trees could fit the definition of a “spite 
fence,” but the court clarified that relief is only available under the statute 
when an obstruction injures “comfort or enjoyment” of property.96
89. Sher, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (noting the plaintiff’s interpretation of the Act
would extend “the scope of the Act to absurd proportions”); see also CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 25986 (2013) (allowing limited exemptions for passive solar collectors); 
Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 493–94 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25985 (2013)) (upholding the validity of a provision in 
the Solar Shade Control Act that allows municipalities to “opt out” of the Act’s 
requirements by majority vote).  
  
Subsequently, the California Court of Appeal held that courts can look to 
90. Vanderpol v. Starr, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“[A] row
of trees, as opposed to a single tree, could constitute a ‘structure’ within the 
meaning of [the statute].”); Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 841.4 (2013)). 
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 841.4 (2013).
92. Id.
93. Wilson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269–70.
94. Id. at 370–71 (internal citations omitted).
95. Id. at 269–70.
96. Vanderpol, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 512.
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either the subjective intent of the individual who built the fence or to 
objective or circumstantial evidence of intent when determining whether the 
“dominant purpose” of the fence was malicious.97
Neither the spite fence statute nor case law specify the number of 
trees required for a row of trees to constitute a fence.  In Vanderpol, the 
defendants planted a row of at least twenty pine trees and at least sixty-five 
Italian Cypresses.
 
98  In Wilson, the fence contained at least seventeen Leland 
cypress trees99 and the court found it relevant that the row of trees had 
“fence-like” qualities.100  Therefore, if even a small group of trees planted 
along a property line obstruct light or air, property owners may be able to 
utilize the spite fence statute to remove the obstruction.  Alternatively, 
property owners who use rows of trees to demarcate property boundaries 
should be aware that the row of trees might be vulnerable under the spite 
fence statute.101
IV. Calculating Damages for Tortious Harm to Trees
  
The standard measure for damages caused by tortious injury to
property is “the amount which will compensate for all the detriment 
proximately caused thereby.”102  There is no fixed rule for how courts should 
calculate damage to trees.103  Courts generally consider diminution in value 
of the tree as well as restoration costs.104  However, plaintiffs may only 
recover “reasonable costs of replacing destroyed trees with identical or 
substantially similar trees.”105
97. Vanderpol v. Starr, D062350, 2014 WL 1624069, at *10–12 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 24, 2014) (unpublished opinion). 
  Some courts recommend awarding costs for 
98. Id. at 3.
99. Wilson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265.
100. Id.; see Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Witrak, 810 P.2d 27,
30–31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a row of trees planted along a property line 
can be considered a fence).  
101. Wilson, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269 (explaining that a fence-like structure
designed to demarcate a property boundary “does not need to be more than 10 feet 
high to serve that purpose”). 
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (2013).
103. Kallis v. Sones, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 422–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
104. Id.; see also Hammond v. United States, 246 F. 40, 49 (9th Cir. 1917)
(holding that courts should assess the value of timber at the place it was cut, and 
should not discount for the cost of manufacturing the wood into lumber). 
105. Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 108–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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the planting of saplings and immature trees, rather than mature trees of 
similar condition to the ones that were damaged or destroyed.106
When assessing the value of trees, some courts have looked at the 
diminution of value to the entire property on which the trees grew, rather 
than the intrinsic value of the trees themselves.
 
107  In Kolberg v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., the plaintiff applied a defective anti-scale spray made by the 
defendant to his trees, destroying his orchard.108  The California Court of 
Appeal held that damages should be assessed according to the diminution 
of value of the entire orchard, rather than to individual trees.109  This 
principle was affirmed in Rony v. Costa, when the court held that damages 
should be determined by “the difference between the value of the property 
before and after the injury.”110
However, diminution of the market value of trees is not “an absolute 
limitation” when assessing damages.
  
111  Courts have also considered the 
“personal” value of trees.112
106. Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 108–10 (holding that a $241,257 cost of
replanting mature trees was unreasonable when saplings could be planted for 
$19,610). 
  For example, in Kallis v. Sones, the California 
Court of Appeal for the Second District noted that an Aleppo pine provided 
“personal value” because it shaded a playhouse that was constructed for the 
107. Roche v. Casissa, 316 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (evaluating “the
true measure of damages to be the damage to the freehold, rather than the value of 
the trees themselves . . . and not with respect to any intrinsic value of the trees as so 
much wood”). 
108. Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 269 P. 975, 976 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928).
109. Id. at 977 (“[T]he damages awarded were intended to cover the damage to
the land, and not that suffered by the separate trees.”); see also Santa Barbara 
Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856, 861–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that courts may look at lost profits when analyzing the value of trees 
on a pistachio farm). 
110. Rony v. Costa, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: HARM TO LAND FROM PAST INVASIONS § 929 cmt. f (1979) 
(“For the destruction of or damage to . . . mature timber trees that have a market 
value or a value distinguishable from the value of the land, the owner can, at his 
election, recover for the loss or diminution of the value of the thing injured or 
destroyed, in substitution for the diminution in value of the land as a whole.”). 
111. Rony, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 647 (citing Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 106–07).
112. Kallis v. Sones, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 423–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); see also
Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 107–08 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: HARM TO
LAND FROM PAST INVASIONS § 929 cmt. b (1979)) (stating that restoration costs that 
exceed the diminution in fair market value may be awarded when the plaintiff has 
personal reasons for restoring the property to its original condition). 
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plaintiff’s children and grandchildren.113  California courts have also 
considered the aesthetic value of trees when assessing damages.114  In Rony 
v. Costa, the court provided the plaintiff for his “loss in aesthetic pleasure.”115
Similarly, in Baker v. Pierce, the court considered “ornamental and shade
value” when calculating damages for trees that were negligently removed by
construction workers.116  Calculating lost aesthetic value is necessarily a
subjective inquiry, but property owners can take proactive steps to
document the aesthetic value of their trees by taking pictures or videos of
the trees.  Tree owners can also take proactive steps to appraise the value of
their trees; some tree appraisal services are even available online.117
California courts have recognized that trees can be injured in many 
different ways and courts have held that damages are available for a wide 
range of potential injuries.  Property owners may collect damages when their 
trees are cut, uprooted, or trampled and may even collect damages for trees 
where the injury is proximately caused by a fire.118  Damages are also 
available when trees are poisoned by a third party.  In Santa Barbara Pistachio 
Ranch v. Chowchilla Water District, the court awarded damages when the 
plaintiff damaged his trees after irrigating them with contaminated water 
provided by the defendant.119  Likewise, in Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., the 
court held that damages were available when the plaintiff’s trees were 
poisoned by a defective insecticide.120
When assessing damages to trees that grow on a boundary line, courts 
may prorate damages according to the injured party’s proportional interest 
  
113. Kallis, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 422–23.
114. Rony, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 647–48 (quoting Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 108–09 (“[T]he landowner may recover the value of the trees or shrubbery, 
either as timber or for their aesthetic qualities . . . .”). 
115. Id. at 647–48.
116. Baker v. Pierce, 223 P.2d 286, 287–288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950).
117. Tree Protection Toolkit: Appraisal Calculators, AMERICAN 
FORESTS, http://www.americanforests.org/bigtrees/tree-protection-toolkit/calculate-
the-value-of-your-tree (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
118. See, e.g., Kelly v. CB & I Constructors, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 48–49 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009); Kennedy v. Minarets & W. Ry. Co., 266 P. 353, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) 
(“[D]anger from fires in a dry country like California is so great as to justify the police 
power of the state in imposing treble damages . . . .”).  
119. Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
856, 858–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
120. Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 269 P. 975, 976 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928).
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in the tree.121  However, courts can compensate co-owners for the value of 
the entire tree if one of the owners benefits from the use of the entire tree.122 
For example, if the canopy of the entire tree provides shade for one co-
owner, that co-owner can recover for damage to the entire tree, even if part 
of the tree that provides shade is located on their neighbor’s property.123
When damage to trees is willful or intentional, plaintiffs may collect 
damages equivalent to three times the value of the actual detriment, but 
courts must award damages equal to twice the sum of the actual 
detriment.
  
124  If the trespass is casual, involuntary, or if the trespasser was 
mistaken about the ownership of the tree, courts must award damages 
equivalent to twice the value of the actual detriment.125  Subsequent case 
law has upheld the validity of the double and treble damage provisions in 
the Civil Code,126
121. Kallis v. Sones, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 421–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (citing
Happy Bunch, LLC v. Grandview North, LLC, 173 P.2d 959, 965–66 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2007)). 
 but courts have held that double and treble damages for 
122. Kallis, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 421–22.
123. Id.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3346 (2013); CAL CODE CIV. PROC. § 733 (2013) (providing
treble damages for trespasses that cause damage to trees); Baker v. Ramirez, 235 Cal. 
Rptr. 857, 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Drewry v. Welch, 46 Cal. Rptr. 65, 78 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1965)) (“Under this section, if the trespass is found to be willful and malicious, 
the court may impose treble damages but must impose double damages.”); see also 
Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 110–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (“Statutes providing 
for recovery of double or treble damages for injuries to trees are intended to make 
timber appropriation unprofitable.”); cf. A.B. 2071, Cal. State. Assembly, 2011–2012 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (unpassed bill that would have amended section 3346 of the 
Civil Code to provide double damages for individuals who were harmed by 
trespassers who intended to make commercial use of the wood).  
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3346(a) (2013); Baker, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (citing Drewry,
46 Cal. Rptr. at 78) (“[I]f the trespass is found to be casual and involuntary or under a 
mistake of fact, the court must impose double damages.”); cf. Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. 
at 111 (stating that courts should “exercise broad discretion in determining what 
amount will achieve just and reasonable compensation” when calculating damages). 
126. See, e.g., Ostling v. Loring, 33 Cal .Rptr.2d 391, 401–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that defendant’s due process rights were not violated when property 
owner’s complaint did specify that doubling of damages was possible under the 
statute); Ghera v. Sugar Pine Lumber Co., 36 Cal. Rptr. 305, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) 
(holding that the statute should be strictly construed). 
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injuries to trees are penal and punitive rather than remedial.127 
Consequently, when courts award double or treble damages, they are not 
permitted to grant exemplary damages under section 3294 of the California 
Civil Code.128  An additional award of exemplary damages would, in effect, 
punish the defendant twice, and would not achieve the policy goals 
underlying section 3294 of “educating blunderers . . . and discouraging 
rogues.”129
V. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Tree Growth
  In any case, citizens should be aware that there is a high price to 
pay for causing willful damage to trees. 
Many municipalities in California have adopted complex regulatory
frameworks for the growth, care, and removal of trees. San Francisco’s Public 
Works Code provides strict guidelines for the growth and care of trees.130 
One notable aspect of San Francisco’s ordinance is that it is unlawful to 
injure or destroy a “significant tree” or a landmark tree.”131  Some tree 
ordinances restrict the extent to which trees can obstruct views.  For 
example, Berkeley’s Solar Access and Views Ordinance has the stated goal of 
“[restoring] access to light and views from the surrounding locale.”132  Other 
ordinances require property owners to conserve energy by using trees to 
create shade.  In Los Angeles, applications for landscape approval must 
contain “a proposal for shading of walls of structures.”133




127. Baker, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (citing Helm v. Bollman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725–
26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)); Drewry, 46 Cal. Rptr at 72–73 (citing Caldwell v. Walker, 27 
Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)). 
  If trees obstruct “sidewalks, parkings, or streets,” 
municipalities can require the removal of these trees and “make the cost of 
128. Baker, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
129. Id.; see also Kelly, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 45, 48–49 (holding that mandatory
double damages under section 3346 of the Cal. Civil Code are not precluded by 
section 13007 of the Cal. Health and Safety Code, which provides damages for 
property destroyed in a fire). 
130. S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE, art. 16 (1995).
131. Id. § 808.
132. BERKELEY, CAL., HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, ch. 12.44 et. seq. (2012), available at
http://codepublishing.com/ca/berkeley/html/pdfs/Berkeley12.pdf. 
133. LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUNI. CODE, § 12.42(A)(2) (1996), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/losangeles.shtml. 
134. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 39501 (2013) (permitting the removal of “weeds” and
“rank growths”); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 14876 (2013) (“Weeds may be 
declared a public nuisance and may be abated.”).  
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removal a lien upon the abutting property.”135  Similarly, municipalities may 
also require the removal of trees that are “dangerous or injurious to 
neighboring property.”136  Municipalities can also regulate the growth of 
weeds when offending plants constitute a public nuisance.137  States may 
legitimately exercise police powers to advance aesthetic values,138
A. Challenges to Municipal Tree Ordinances
 so 
municipalities could potentially force the removal of trees that offend public 
aesthetics.  Property owners should be mindful of the fact that 
municipalities have broad ranging police powers to regulate tree growth. 
Property owners should also do their part to ensure that trees do not cause 
harm to others, such that a municipality would feel compelled to take action 
and remove the tree.  
As a general principle, a land use ordinance is only unconstitutional 
when “[its] provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare.”139  In some jurisdictions, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 
pre-requisite to judicial action challenging planning decisions.140  Courts 
have held that land use regulations on landscaping are a valid police 
power141
135. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 39502(a) (2013); see also Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph-
Cable Co., 164 P. 35, 36–37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917) (“[W]here trees so grown are cut, 
trimmed, or removed by the city or town for the purpose of facilitating the use of the 
street in a legal manner by the public, then the damage resulting from such cutting 
or removal to the owner of the property in front of which such trees are standing is 
damnum absque injuria . . . .”). 
 and consequently, facial challenges to municipal tree ordinances 
must overcome significant hurdles.  
136. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 39502(b) (2013).
137. See, e.g., Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515, 523–34 (Cal. Ct. App.
1962). 
138. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984); see
Metromedia Inc., v. City of San Diego, 610 P.2d 407, 414 (Cal. 1980) (holding that 
aesthetics alone justify the use of municipal police power), rev’d on other grounds, 453 
U.S. 490 (1981). 
139. Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 486
(Cal. 1976). 
140. San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 766 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
141. Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 169–70
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal. 
1996)); see also Kucera v. Lizza, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“It is not 
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For example, in Kucera v. Lizza, a property owner challenged a Tiburon, 
California ordinance that regulated tree growth after he was ordered to cut 
down trees that obstructed a neighbor’s view of San Francisco Bay.142  The 
California Court of Appeal ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of 
the municipality’s police power because it advanced the city’s aesthetic 
values.143  The court held that the preservation of sunlight was a valid “police 
power purpose” and that the ordinance was analogous to restrictions on the 
height of buildings or fences.144  Additionally, the court noted that 
ordinances that regulate views and sunlight do not have to comply with 
formal easement law.145
Do municipal restrictions on tree growth constitute a taking under the 
terms of the Fifth Amendment?  The Court of Appeal did not discuss the 
takings issue directly in Kucera v. Lizza, but the court did note in dicta that “it 
is hard to imagine on this record how compliance with the ordinance and 
resultant tree trimming might result in an unconstitutional taking.”
  
146  Four 
years later, in Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, the Court of Appeal 
held that limitations on the height of pre-existing foliage “[are] a legitimate 
exercise of police power which does not rise to the level of a taking.”147  The 
court noted that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that they had a vested 
right to own foliage of a certain height and that these kinds of restrictions on 
tree height were a legitimate exercise of the city’s police power.148
In Echevarrieta, the Court of Appeal distinguished the facts of that case 
from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and rejected the notion that the 
plaintiff had “reasonable investment backed expectations” to maintain trees 
of a certain height.
  
149
irrational for a community to plan its physical surroundings in such a way that 
unsightliness is minimized . . . .”). 
  The court noted that restrictions on tree height did 
142. Kucera, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588; cf. TIBURON, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 15, §
15-3 (1968) (granting persons “the right to preserve and seek restoration of views or
sunlight which existed at any time since they purchased or occupied a property,
when such views or sunlight are from the primary living area or active use area, and
have subsequently been unreasonably obstructed by the growth of trees”).
143. Kucera, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588 (citing Metromedia Inc., 610 P.2d at 414).
144. Id. at 588–89, 591 (citing Pacifica Homeowners Ass’n v. Wesley Palms
Retirement Cmty., 224 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). 
145. Id. at 1152.
146. Kucera, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592.
147. Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 171–72
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
148. Id.
149. Id. at 170–71 (distinguishing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1007–09 (1998)). 
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not deprive the plaintiff of “of any significant economically beneficial use of 
his land.”150  Like restrictions on building heights, restrictions on tree 
heights “do not amount to a taking merely because they might incidentally 
restrict a use, diminish the value, or impose a cost in connection with the 
property.”151
B. Duties and Obligations when Caring for Trees Planted by
a Municipality
  Following the Court of Appeal’s precedent in Echevarrieta, it is 
unlikely that courts will find restrictions on tree height to be an 
unconstitutional taking.  
Many property owners take responsibility for watering, trimming, 
pruning, and caring for publically owned trees.152  In these situations, 
citizens assume certain duties when they provide care for publically owned 
trees.  Regular trimming or sweeping of leaves from a publicly owned 
planting strip does not establish a duty to warn bystanders about potential 
dangers that exist on that planting strip.153  However, a duty to warn will 
arise when property owners exert a “notorious and open display of control” 
over publicly owned trees where members of the public “might reasonably 
rely on the apparent owner to warn or protect them from known hazards 
thereon.”154  Citizens who care for publicly owned trees should also be aware 
that constructing a fence around a strip of publicly owned land can function 
as adverse possession, thereby conveying the land for the “exclusive use and 
enjoyment” of the adverse possessor.155
150. Echevarrieta, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d at  171
  Although private citizens may have 
the best interests of their neighborhood at heart when they care for 
publically owned trees, these citizens should be aware that they assume a 
large degree of liability by providing care for these trees.  
151. Id. (citing Elrich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal. 1996)).
152. Some municipalities do not permit private citizens to trim publically
owned trees without first obtaining a permit. See, e.g., Culver City Tree 
Maintenance Frequently Asked Questions, CULVER CITY, http://www.culvercity.org/ 
Government/PublicWorks/MaintenanceOperations/TreeMaintenance.aspx. 
153. Contreras v. Anderson, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Alcaraz v. Vece, 929 P.2d 1239, 1249–50, 1253 (Cal. 1997)); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS: NATURAL CONDITIONS § 363 cmt. e (requiring property owners who control trees 
next to public highways to take reasonable steps to prevent harm when they are 
aware of the dangerous condition of the tree). 
154. Contreras, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76 (citing Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d
944, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
155. Lofstad v. Murasky, 91 P. 1008, 1010 (Cal. 1907).
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VI. Policy Recommendations
When formulating tree law and policy, lawmakers must balance public,
social, and environmental interests against private property rights.156 
Effective tree laws must therefore respond to the normative conflicts 
inherent within these divergent interests.  The development of urban forests 
requires the full participation of citizens and local governments, where 
control of urban forests is focused at the local level.157
The best framework for resolving these normative conflicts is to utilize 
adaptive co-management strategies.  Under this framework, policies for tree 
management are formulated by local communities (rather than state 
agencies), where policy makers continually reevaluate strategies according 
to the latest scientific knowledge and the needs of communities.
  Lawmakers should 
favor policies that facilitate the development of sustainable urban forests 
and laws should encourage private citizens to participate in the active 
management of both public and privately owned trees. 
158  Local 
communities should have flexibility to develop tree laws that respond to the 
unique needs of their community, as well as unique ecological challenges 
that may not exist on a statewide level.  In some respects, the many varied 
local tree ordinances in California represent an adaptive co-management 
system that is already in place.159
156. See, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustainability and the Urban Forest, 51 NAT. RES. J.
233, 236 (2011) (“Urban forestry requires an investigation into the ties between the 
community’s environmental, economic, and social needs.”).  
  San Francisco and Los Angeles, for 
example, have responded to the individual needs of their communities in 
unique ways by instituting urban forest management plans that respond to 
157. Janet A. Choi, Note, Cultivating Urban Forests Policies in Developing Countries, 11
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, 39, 39–40 (2010); cf. Edward J. Sullivan & Alexia Solomou, 
“Preserving Forest Land for Forest Uses” – Land Use Policies for Oregon Forest Lands, 26 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 179, 246–47 (2011) (arguing that the best way to manage forest resources is
through state agencies, rather than local land use regulation).
158. Jonathan Liljeblad, Adaptive Co-Management Thresholds: Understanding Protected
Areas Policy as Normative Conflict, 19 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 236 (2013) 
(noting that vesting decision-making power in local communities “will alleviate 
conflicts between the natural ecosystem and human interests”); see also Fikret Berkes, 
Devolution of Environment and Resources Governance: Trends and Future, 37 ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION 489, 489–90 (2010); Lisen Schultz, et al., Participation, Adaptive Co-
Management, and Management Performance in the World Network of Biosphere Reserves, 39 
WORLD DEV. 662, 662–63 (2010); cf. Kai Chan et al., When Agendas Collide: Human Welfare 
and Biological Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 59, 60 (2007) (criticizing the 
strategy of vesting decision-making power in local communities).  
159. See supra Parts II.C, IV.
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the different social, ecological, and economic circumstances in each city.160
Lawmakers should also provide incentives to private citizens to care 
for publically owned trees.  Under the current state of the law, when private 
citizens provide care for publically owned trees, those citizens might assume 
liability for foreseeable harm proximately caused by those trees.
 
Consequently, state agencies and the legislature should be careful to not 
divest decision-making authority from local communities.  
161  Instead, 
liability should remain with the municipality or agency that originally 
planted the trees.162
A successful tree policy should prioritize preserving the life of trees 
above expedient resolutions to tree disputes.  Consequently, courts should 
continue to discourage the use of self-help when resolving encroachment 
disputes between neighbors.
  Private citizens should not be penalized for openly 
watering and pruning trees—these good Samaritans should instead receive 
government subsidies for taking care of their local environment and 
improving their neighborhoods.  
163  The value of trees extends to society as a 
whole164 and courts must weigh the value of a tree to an entire community 
against the nuisance caused by the encroaching tree.165
Trees provide ecological, aesthetic, and social benefits to all members 
of the community in which the trees grow.
  If property owners 
took the law into their own hands to resolve tree disputes, this could 
undermine the goals of adaptive co-management strategies that attempt to 
satisfy the needs of all citizens in a community. 
166  Even privately owned trees 
provide benefits to the community at large.  Therefore, courts should 
provide standing to citizens to sue for harms to any tree that provides an 
ecological, social, or aesthetic benefit to their community.167
160. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
  Building 
161. See supra Part V.B.
162. Of course, liability should remain with private citizens when the care of
trees is negligent and falls below reasonable standards of care. 
163. See Booska v. Patel, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 241, 242–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that property owners do not have an absolute right to cut off encroaching 
branches and roots). 
164. See Choi, supra note 158, at 39.
165. In rare circumstances where trees or tree branches pose an imminent
danger of falling and damaging a neighbor’s property, the neighbor should be able to 
utilize self-help to protect themselves from the immediate danger.  
166. See Choi, supra note 158.
167. In Sierra Club v. Morton, Justice Douglas’ dissenting opinion argued that
trees should have standing.  405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]oncern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the 
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successful urban forests is a collaborative effort that requires the 
participation of all members of a community.  Thus, lawmakers should 
provide remedies for harm to shared resources, including publicly owned 
trees that are utilized and enjoyed by all people. 
Although it is important to protect shared resources, it is also 
important for lawmakers to strike an appropriate balance between public 
and private interests.  Trees are simultaneously vital ecological resources 
and economic commodities—these definitions are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.168  Timber,169 fruit,170 and nuts171 are essential components of our 
state and national economy and it is important to protect reasonable 
economic uses of trees.  Consequently, publically owned trees on state and 
federal land should be held in public trust,172 but trees situated on private 
property should still be considered private property.173
conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own 
preservation.”). 
  This way, private 
citizens can bring a tort claim if they are directly harmed by the misuse or 
168. Urban forestry contributes billions of dollars in sales to the California
economy.  See Scott R. Templeton & George E. Goldman, Urban Forestry Adds $3.8 
Billion in Sales to California Economy, 50 CAL. AGRIC. 6 (1996), http://ucanr.edu/ 
repositoryfiles/ca5001p6-69747.pdf. 
169. In 2011, California’s timber industry was valued at $51.8 billion.
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS REVIEW: 2012–2013, CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC. 19 
(2013), www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/pdfs/2013/FinalDraft2012-2013.pdf. 
170. In California, the production of fruits and nuts is an $18.7 billion industry,
and California accounts for forty-two percent of national citrus production.  USDA, 
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS: 2012 CROP YEAR,  38 (2013) http://www.nass.usda. 
gov/Statistics_by_State/California/Publications/California_Ag_Statistics/Reports/2012
cas-all.pdf.  
171. California produces eighty percent of the world’s almonds and around
forty percent of the world’s pistachios, while ninety percent of the United States’ tree 
nuts come from California.  Id. 
172. Cf. JAMES L. HUFFMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION: STATE POWER, 
PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC LIBERTIES 100–01 (2013) (“Governments’ legal interest [in 
public lands] is no different from that of any other proprietor . . . .  The public right 
with respect to public property is only the political right . . . to demand different 
policies of their elected representatives or to replace those representatives with 
different people.”). 
173. Some scholars advocate for a broad application of the public trust
doctrine to all privately held resources, and that “certain resources never actually 
were subject to private usurpation, or never should have been.”  David Takacs, The 
Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and The Future of Private Property, 16 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 711, 761 (2008).  
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mismanagement of privately owned trees, but private citizens still retain 
primary decision-making authority to manage the use of privately owned 
trees.174
Most importantly, tree law should attempt to foster an ethos of respect 
and mindfulness for the gifts of nature with which we have been blessed. 
Every tree is a miracle of life and our laws should encourage citizens to treat 
trees with dignity.  Lawmakers must strike a careful balance between private 
property rights on one hand and public interests in ecology, social utility, 
and aesthetics on the other hand.  This balance will not be easy to achieve, 
but the best outcomes will blend idealism with pragmatism. 
  
VII. Conclusions
Tree disputes can be costly and annoying, but many can be avoided
with proper precautions.  Property owners should never cut encroaching 
trees if injury to the tree is a foreseeable result.  If encroaching trees pose a 
danger or constitute a nuisance, property owners can apply for injunctive 
relief to remedy the offending branches or roots.  However, injunctive relief 
is not available to remove trees that obstruct light or air.  Property owners 
should also be aware of applicable municipal ordinances, as these often 
present a unique array of requirements for individuals who own, manage, 
and care for trees.  
Trees are valuable shared resources that provide benefits to all 
members of a community.  As tree law develops over the next few decades, 
lawmakers should create laws that provide incentives to individuals to care 
for the health and welfare of trees.  Additionally, lawmakers should utilize 
adaptive co-management strategies to empower local communities to create 
polices for tree management that change according to the evolving social, 
economic, and ecological needs of the community.  In doing so, lawmakers 
should carefully balance public and private interests in the ownership and 
management of trees.  Finally, the concept of trees as private property 
should not be eliminated entirely.  
174. It is important to consider that “Citizen A” can retain a property interest
in a tree that grows on “Citizen B’s” land, and the concept of ownership does not 
necessarily follow land ownership. 
